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Updates from PA Governor’s Office 
*No new updates this month 
Updates from the PA Legislature 
*No new updates this month 
 
 
Updates from the Courts 
U.S. Supreme Court 
*No new updates this month 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE UPDATE 
A monthly newsletter produced by the ACBA Fellow at Gettysburg 
College 
Keep up to date with 
developments in criminal law, 
criminal procedure, and victims 
issues via this monthly 
newsletter.  
Comments or questions? 





PA Supreme Court 
Criminal Law & Procedure 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DUWAYNE A. DIXON, JR.   
DECIDED: August 6, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-45-2021mo%20-%20104858242142451438.pdf?cb=3 
  
“In this matter the trial court instructed the jury, prior to deliberations, that one of the prerequisites 
necessary to establish the crime of witness intimidation as a firstdegree felony had been fulfilled. We 
allowed appeal to consider whether that instruction violated the defendant’s right to a jury trial under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). While the victim, Andre Ripley, was at a public park in Wilkinsburg, 
Allegheny County, Joshua Evans attempted to rob him at gunpoint. Ripley fled, at which point Evans 
opened fire. Three rounds struck Ripley, and another struck a three-month-old infant. Both victims 
survived and Ripley eventually identified Evans, who was the leader of a gang called the J-Town Soldiers, 
as the shooter. Evans was arrested and charged with a variety of offenses. Ripley was set to be the 
Commonwealth’s lead witness at Evans’ trial. Two weeks before the trial was scheduled to begin, Ripley 
was outside his home when he was shot a second time. Although he was shot in the head, he again 
survived. After an investigation, the police concluded that Appellant – who also belonged to the JTown 
Soldiers – was the shooter, and that he shot Ripley at Evans’ behest to prevent Ripley from testifying at 
Evans’ upcoming trial. Appellant was arrested and charged with, inter alia, aggravated assault, 
attempted homicide, criminal conspiracy, and witness intimidation. The latter charge is the one at issue 
in this appeal.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MARK EDWARDS 
DECIDED: August 17, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-11-2021mo%20-%20104866433143170704.pdf?cb=1 
 
“In this case, we construe our merger statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765,1 and consider for sentencing purposes 
whether Appellant’s conviction for Recklessly Endangering Another Person (REAP), 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705,2 
merges into his conviction for Aggravated Assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1). 3 More precisely, 
we consider whether the Superior Court correctly evaluated the statutory elements of each crime for 
which Appellant was convicted, rather than the particular proven facts, in determining merger was not 
appropriate. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Superior Court’s decision regarding the discrete 
issue before us.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. GREGORY JORDAN 
DECIDED: August 17, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-37-2021mo%20-%20104866296143157819.pdf?cb=1 
  
“We consider whether inconsistent verdicts rendered by separate factfinders in a simultaneous jury and 
bench trial implicate double jeopardy and collateral estoppel concerns, such that a defendant, who was 
acquitted by the jury on the charges it considered, may not also be found guilty by the trial court of 
other charges. We conclude that a defendant who elects to proceed with a simultaneous jury and bench 
trial during a single prosecution is subjected to only one trial and therefore double jeopardy and 
collateral estoppel do not apply to preclude the guilty verdict rendered by the judge.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JORDAN ADONIS RAWLS 
DECIDED: August 17, 2021                                                                
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-15-2021mo%20-%20104866297143158064.pdf.pdf?cb=2 
  
“This appeal concerns whether law enforcement agents violated the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution when, although issuing Miranda warnings to an arrestee during an interrogation, 
they failed to specifically apprise him that criminal charges already had been filed against him. In 
October 2016, Appellant and Joseph Coleman perpetrated a home-invasion robbery in Williamsport, 
during which Kristine Kibler and her son, Shane Wright, were shot and killed. An accomplice, Casey 
Wilson, served in the role of a getaway driver. Police investigated and garnered evidence giving rise to 
probable cause to believe that Appellant participated in the crimes, and a complaint charging him with 
two counts of criminal homicide and related offenses was filed. Shortly thereafter -- after learning that 
his picture was circulating in the media in association with the killings -- Appellant [J-15-2021] - 2 
voluntarily presented himself at a police station to address what he initially depicted to the agents as 
the “crazy nonsense” he had heard. Transcript of Audio/Video Recording dated Nov. 11, 2016, in 
Commonwealth v. Rawls, No. CR-89-2017 (C.P. Lycoming) [hereinafter, “A/V Recording”], at 11.  
Appellant was immediately placed under arrest. While shackled, Appellant was interrogated by agents 
for a period of five-and-one half hours. At the outset, the lead investigator related to Appellant his rights 
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Among other things, he was told of his 
entitlement to be represented by an attorney during questioning and warned that anything that he said 
could and would be used against him in a court of law. See A/V Recording at 5. Appellant orally waived 
his rights and signed a written waiver form. He was also specifically admonished that: he was under 
arrest; he wasn’t free to leave; the agents were investigating the criminal homicides that had appeared 
in the news; and they had probable cause to obtain a warrant for his arrest. See id. at 7. The agents, 
however, did not specifically advise Appellant that charges already had been lodged against him. During 
the interrogation, Appellant initially denied knowing Coleman or Wilson and pervasively lied about his 
whereabouts before, at, and after the time of the home invasion. The agents repeatedly confronted him 
with contrary evidence, including video surveillance footage showing the three co-perpetrators together 
in various locations, as well as phone records documenting extensive contacts, in relevant time frames. 
Ultimately, Appellant admitted that he was present at the crime scene when the robbery and homicides 
were committed, but he professed to having been unarmed, claiming to have served “basically like . . . 
the lookout.” Id. at 236.1.  
Appellant filed a pretrial motion seeking to suppress evidence of the interview. In one line of 
argumentation, he contended that, in the totality of the circumstances, his incriminatory statements 
were the product of inappropriate police tactics entailing deception, manipulation, and psychological 
coercion, thus invalidating his Miranda waiver per the Fifth Amendment. See Brief in Support of 
Omnibus Motion dated June 1, 2018, in Commonwealth v. Rawls, No. CR-89-2017 (C.P. Lycoming), at 8-
9, 14-23. See generally Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 433-34, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2330-31 (2000) 
(discussing the due-process-related background pertaining to the voluntariness of confessions, and the 
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause). In the second line of his presentation, 
which gives rise to the legal question now before this Court, Appellant asserted that the agents violated 
his Sixth Amendment rights when they failed to inform him that criminal charges already had been filed 
against him. It was his position that, without such information, the waiver of his rights could not be 
deemed to have been knowing and intelligent. See generally Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786, 
129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009) (discussing the knowing-voluntary-and intelligent litmus associated with a 
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, we apply the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United 
States that, “[s]o long as the accused is made aware of the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation’ during post-indictment questioning, by use of the Miranda warnings, his waiver of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at such questioning is ‘knowing and intelligent.’” Patterson, 487 U.S. 
at 300, 108 S. Ct. at 2399. While there are exceptional circumstances in which a Miranda waiver will not 
be effective for Sixth Amendment purposes, see id. at 296 n.8, 108 S. Ct. at 2397 n.8, we hold that there 
is no per se rule, arising under this amendment, invalidating such a waiver merely because an arrestee 
was not advised that charges had been filed. The order of the Superior Court is affirmed.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JAMES HENRY COBBS 
DECIDED: August 17, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-16-2021mo%20-%20104866529143176035.pdf?cb=1 
   
“The offense of assault by a life prisoner is defined, in relevant part, as aggravated assault with a deadly 
weapon or instrument by an individual “who has been sentenced to death or life imprisonment” and 
“whose sentence has not been commuted;” the penalty for that offense is life imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S. 
§ 2704. The issue presented in this appeal, which arises under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 
§§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”), is whether Appellant James Henry Cobbs’ conviction of assault by a life prisoner 
is vitiated where a court subsequently vacated his predicate sentence of life imprisonment on grounds 
that it violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and resentenced him on the 
underlying offense to a term of 40 years to lifetime incarceration. We hold that under the circumstances 
presented, Appellant’s life sentence imposed for his conviction of assault by a life prisoner cannot stand. 
Accordingly, we vacate the Superior Court’s judgment, which affirmed the PCRA court’s order dismissing 
Appellant’s PCRA petition. We further reverse the PCRA court’s order and vacate Appellant’s judgment 
of sentence and his related conviction under Section 2704.” 
 
PA Superior Court 
(Reporting only cases with precedential value)  
Criminal Law & Procedure 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOHN DAVID ZACK, SR. 
FILED: August 17, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S19038-21o%20-%20104867265143247097.pdf?cb=1 
“John David Zack, Sr. (Zack) appeals from the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County 
(PCRA court) denying his timely first petitions for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 
Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Zack was convicted in two separate cases for failing to comply with sex offender 
registration requirements under both the current version of the offense (18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1) and the 
former version under Megan’s Law III (18 Pa.C.S. § 4915). After review, we reverse Zack’s convictions 
and judgments of sentence under the now repealed Section 4915 but affirm the denial of relief for his 
conviction under Section 4915.1.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ERIC ROGERS 
FILED: August 19, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S19028-19o%20-%20104869966144243321.pdf?cb=1 
“The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded this appeal to us for the limited purpose of resolving the 
merits of one issue: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it decided that its non-jury 
verdicts of guilty against Eric Rogers were not against the weight of the evidence, so as to shock the trial 
court’s conscience. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, ___ A.3d ___, No. 8 EAP 2020, 2021 WL 1975272 (Pa. 
2021) (“Rogers II”). We initially affirmed the trial court’s judgment of sentence, imposing an aggregate 
term of 55 to 170 years’ incarceration on 46 crimes.1 See Commonwealth v. Rogers, No. 342 EDA 2017, 
2019 WL 4686960 (unpublished) (Pa. Super. 2019) (“Rogers I”), affirmed in part, vacated in part, Rogers 
II, supra. After further review, we find no abuse of discretion, because Rogers failed to address his 
appellate argument to that deferential standard of review for his weight-of-the-evidence claim. 
Accordingly, we reaffirm the judgment of sentence.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANDREW DULA III 
FILED: August 20, 2021 
Contact Information 





“Andrew Dula, III (Appellant), appeals from the judgment of sentence entered June 14, 2019, in the 
Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury convictions of attempted involuntary deviate 
sexual intercourse (IDSI), institutional sexual assault,1 and related crimes for his sexual abuse of a 
mentally and physically disabled woman in his care. Appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to 
strike a juror for cause, and abused its discretion by permitting testimony concerning primitive sounds 
and non-verbal conduct by the victim, a bruise on the victim, and Appellant’s odd work behavior; 
denying a motion for a mistrial after the arresting officer stated he did not believe Appellant’s denial of 
culpability; refusing to instruct the jury that the victim would not be called to testify because she lacked 
testimonial competency; and admitting Appellant’s inculpatory statement in violation of the corpus 
delicti rule. For the reasons below, we affirm.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. SHAWN CARR 
FILED: August 30, 2021 
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A02007-21o%20-%20104879474145123663.pdf?cb=1 
“Shawn Carr appeals from his July 23, 2019 judgment of sentence of two years of probation, which was 
imposed after he pleaded guilty to indecent assault. After careful review, we vacate Appellant’s 
judgment of sentence and remand with instructions.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
